De OT Security Audit is gebaseerd op praktijkervaring en best practices uit onder andere ISA/IEC 62443 en
NIST 800-82. We richten ons op de hele OT-keten – van asset inventory tot leveranciers en safety.
The OT Security Audit is based on field experience and best practices inspired by ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST 800-82.
We cover the full OT chain – from asset inventory to vendors and safety.
1. OT asset inventory & zichtbaarheid
1. OT asset inventory & visibility
Zonder volledig beeld is risicobeheer onmogelijk. We brengen OT-assets, verbindingen en afhankelijkheden in kaart.
Without full visibility, risk management is impossible. We map OT assets, connections and dependencies.
- SCADA-servers, PLC’s, HMI’s, engineeringstations, veldapparatuur.
- As-built netwerkdiagrammen en verborgen of vergeten apparatuur.
- Verbindingen naar IT, cloud en externe partijen.
- SCADA servers, PLCs, HMIs, engineering stations, field devices.
- As-built network diagrams and hidden or forgotten equipment.
- Connections to IT, cloud and external parties.
2. Netwerksegmentatie & architectuur
2. Network segmentation & architecture
We beoordelen hoe IT, DMZ en OT logisch en fysiek gescheiden zijn, en of segmentatie past bij het
risicoprofiel.
We assess how IT, DMZ and OT are logically and physically separated, and whether segmentation fits the risk profile.
- Zones & conduits, VLAN’s, firewalls en access rules.
- Remote access, jump servers en vendor tunnels.
- Monitoring van verkeer tussen IT en OT.
- Zones & conduits, VLANs, firewalls and access rules.
- Remote access, jump servers and vendor tunnels.
- Monitoring of traffic between IT and OT.
3. Toegangsbeheer & privileges
3. Access control & privilege management
Wie kan inloggen op SCADA, PLC’s en HMI’s, en onder welke voorwaarden? We toetsen accounts, rechten en
vendor-toegang.
Who can log in to SCADA, PLCs and HMIs, and under what conditions? We assess accounts, privileges and vendor access.
- Accounts op OT-systemen, wachtwoordbeleid, hardcoded credentials.
- Vendor- en contractor-toegang, onderhoudslaptops en remote tools.
- Toegangscontrole tot control rooms en paneelkasten.
- Accounts on OT systems, password policy, hardcoded credentials.
- Vendor & contractor access, maintenance laptops and remote tools.
- Access control to control rooms and cabinets.
4. Monitoring, logging & detectie
4. Monitoring, logging & detection
Detectie in OT is vaak beperkt. We kijken naar OT-logging, IDS/IPS en de aansluiting op SOC-processen.
Detection in OT is often limited. We review OT logging, IDS/IPS and integration with SOC processes.
- Logging in SCADA, PLC’s, firewalls en remote access.
- Gebruik van OT IDS/monitoringoplossingen.
- Alarmbeheer en doormelding naar IT/SOC.
- Logging in SCADA, PLCs, firewalls and remote access.
- Use of OT IDS/monitoring solutions.
- Alarm handling and escalation to IT/SOC.
5. Patch-, update- & firmwarebeheer
5. Patch, update & firmware governance
“Never touch a running system” is begrijpelijk, maar risicovol. We beoordelen patchbeleid en
compensating controls.
“Never touch a running system” is understandable but risky. We evaluate patching strategy and compensating controls.
- Patching van Windows-HMI’s en OT-servers.
- Firmwarebeheer voor PLC’s en veldapparatuur.
- Change management en testaanpak in OT.
- Patching of Windows HMIs and OT servers.
- Firmware lifecycle management for PLCs and field devices.
- Change management and testing in OT.
6. Back-up & herstel
6. Backup & recovery
Zonder goede back-ups van PLC-programma’s, SCADA-configuraties en recepten is herstel na incident complex
en traag.
Without solid backups of PLC programs, SCADA configurations and recipes, recovery after an incident is slow and complex.
- Back-up van PLC-code, SCADA-configs en engineeringprojecten.
- Opslaglocaties (online/offline, immutable waar mogelijk).
- Periodiek testen van herstelprocedures.
- Backups of PLC code, SCADA configs and engineering projects.
- Storage locations (online/offline, immutable where possible).
- Regular testing of recovery procedures.
7. Fysieke beveiliging van OT-assets
7. Physical security of OT assets
We beoordelen control rooms, kasten, veldlocaties en toegangsregels rond kritieke OT-apparatuur.
We assess control rooms, cabinets, field locations and access rules around critical OT equipment.
- Beveiliging van control rooms en MCC’s.
- Toegang tot veldpanelen en remote sites.
- Bescherming tegen fysieke sabotage en ongeautoriseerde ingrepen.
- Security of control rooms and MCCs.
- Access to field panels and remote sites.
- Protection against physical tampering and sabotage.
8. OT incidentrespons
8. OT incident response
We kijken hoe u reageert als er iets misgaat: wie doet wat, met welke data en hoe wordt IT/OT afgestemd?
We review how you respond when something goes wrong: who does what, with which data and how IT/OT coordinate.
- Incidentprocessen specifiek voor OT.
- Forensische data uit SCADA, PLC’s en netwerk.
- Samenwerking met IT, SOC en leveranciers.
- Incident processes tailored to OT.
- Forensic data from SCADA, PLCs and network.
- Collaboration with IT, SOC and vendors.
9. Safety & procesimpact
9. Safety & process impact
Cyber en safety raken elkaar steeds vaker. We kijken naar de wisselwerking tussen functionele veiligheid
en OT-beveiliging.
Safety and cybersecurity increasingly overlap. We look at the interaction between functional safety and OT security.
- Koppeling van safety- en securitymaatregelen.
- What-if scenario’s en mogelijke procesimpact.
- Afstemming met HSE, operations en engineering.
- Alignment of safety and security measures.
- What-if scenarios and process impact.
- Coordination with HSE, operations and engineering.
10. Leveranciers & third parties
10. Vendors & third parties
Leveranciers en integrators hebben vaak diepe toegang tot OT-systemen. We beoordelen hoe die toegang is
geregeld, bewaakt en beperkt.
Vendors and integrators often have deep access to OT systems. We review how that access is granted, monitored and limited.
- Vendor-remote toegang en onderhoudskanalen.
- Contractuele afspraken rond OT-beveiliging.
- Afhankelijkheden van OEM’s en integrators.
- Vendor remote access and maintenance channels.
- Contractual security requirements for OT.
- Dependencies on OEMs and integrators.